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Abstract
This article seeks to evaluate how well the different welfare states of Europe perform in
termsofpreventingrecurrentandpersistentincomepovertyandwhathouseholdandindividual
characteristics inﬂuence poverty duration. Because we use cross-national data on longitudinal
poverty, we are able to increase our understanding of the effect of the institutional context
within which poverty occurs. We show that country welfare regimes strongly inﬂuence long-
run poverty, with social democratic countries reducing the level of persistent and recurrent
poverty. Liberal and Southern European regime countries have both higher rates and longer
durations of poverty. Despite their dissimilar patterns of poverty duration, European welfare
states display rather similar patterns of exit from poverty, once we control for duration. There
is some evidence that high initial exit rates from poverty in social democratic and corporatist
countries decrease quickly whereas those in liberal and Southern European countries remain
high, which could suggest lower levels of incentives in the former.
Introduction
There is now a large corpus of cross-sectional poverty studies, many of which
include international comparisons. The best-known and comprehensive pro-
gramme of research is that of the Luxembourg Income Study (Mitchell, 1991;
Smeeding et al., 1990; Atkinson et al., 1995; Deleeck et al., 1992;V a nd e nB o s c h
et al., 1993), yet it is by now widely recognised that poverty is not a static pheno-
menon. For example, whether we see the same or different people in poverty
across cross-sectional surveys taken at different points in time has important
consequences.Forexample,deBeer(2001)hasshownthathighlevelsofeconomic
growthandalargeincreaseinlabourmarketparticipationinthe1980sand1990s
did not reduce poverty in the Netherlands. However, he also showed that a high
turnover rate at the lower end of the income distribution meant that, in general,
poverty spells were short in duration and a small minority remained in poverty
across the whole period. Apart from the magnitude (the poverty gap) and the408 didier fouarge and richard layte
duration (spell-length) of low income, attention should be paid to the extent
to which poverty is recurrent (Walker, 1994). The higher income mobility or
incomevolatilityduringacertaintimeperiodandtheshorterthespell-duration,
the higher the prevalence of poverty in society: that is, the higher the proportion
of people experiencing poverty at least once during the period. Similarly, the
lower the share of recurrent poverty, the higher the prevalence will be.
This means that, if there is very little income mobility over a given period of
time, it is likely that the same individuals will remain poor and the prevalence of
poverty over time will equal the cross-sectional poverty rate. If, on the contrary,
income mobility is high and poverty is experienced for a short period by a larger
proportion of the population, then the probability of being poor is more equally
shared. It could be argued that the latter scenario is preferable on the grounds
of Rawls’s principle of distributional justice (Rawls, 1971). In between these two
situations, poverty can be a revolving door process in which it is the same group
ofpeoplewhoexperiencepoverty,buttheydosorecurrentlyindifferentperiods,
returning to poverty shortly after their previous exit. Whether or not long spells
of poverty are worse than recurrent short spells depends, to a large extent, on
the degree of one’s aversion towards uncertainty. Risk-adverse individuals may
prefer low but stable incomes to higher but unstable ones. Thus, for a complete
picture,informationonthevolatilityofincomepositionsmustcomplementdata
on the duration of low-income spells.




short spells of poverty are always unwelcome, they do not usually threaten sub-
sistence or damage long-term life chances as individuals and households can
reduce expenditure, run down savings or borrow. However, these tactics are
unlikely to be sufﬁcient in the long run. Only by using longitudinal data can
we understand the processes behind cross-sectional statistics: the events leading
individuals into and from poverty and the impact of this poverty on their living
standards.
Comparative studies of income and poverty dynamics are now becoming
more common, but have been conﬁned to a small number of countries (the US,
Germany, Netherlands and the UK) which have long running panel studies.1
These studies have shown that there is a great deal of turnover in the stock of
peoplelivinginpovertyandthatthemajorityofpovertyspellsarerathershortin
duration.However,itisalsoclearthatmanyofthosewhohaveleftpovertyreturn
relatively quickly and a substantial minority experience persistent poverty. The
increasingnumberofwavesavailablefromtheEuropeanCommunityHousehold
Panel(ECHP)nowmakescomparativeresearchofpovertydynamicspossiblefor
anumberofEuropeanUnion(EU)countries.Inthisarticle,weevaluatehowwellwelfare regimes and poverty dynamics 409
the different welfare states of Europe perform in terms of preventing recurrent
andpersistentincomepovertyandwhathouseholdandindividualcharacteristics
inﬂuence poverty duration. This is assessed on the basis of the ﬁrst ﬁve waves of
the ECHP, with panel data on income covering the period 1993–97.
The article unfolds as follows. After detailing theory, hypotheses and data,
we use a typology of poverty proﬁles to examine the differential experience of
transient, recurrent and persistent poverty across EU countries and analyse the
determinants of this experience. However, these models cannot account for data
censoring so we then turn to duration analyses of spells of poverty. In the ﬁnal
section we draw some general conclusions from the ﬁndings of the article.
Poverty dynamics and welfare regime theory
In the context of this article, the most crucial issue is how different country
institutions and regulations impact on the distribution of poverty over time
and duration of poverty events. Different socio-economic structures and welfare
regimes may well ‘decommodify’ individuals to varying degrees and smooth
income ﬂows (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Gallie and Paugam, 2000) and this may
well inﬂuence poverty dynamics in ways that can be formalised in terms of
theoretical expectations. Welfare regime theory – which has been relatively
successful at explaining cross-sectional poverty rates – would predict that where
country beneﬁt systems offer universal income support payments at a relatively
high replacement rate with a wide entitlement in the population, we should
see fewer lower incomes and poverty spells and, where poverty does occur, a
quicker exit than in the case where beneﬁts are more difﬁcult to access and are
at a lower level (Gallie and Paugam, 2000: 4). Moreover, if the welfare regime
is characterised by an emphasis on active, rather than passive labour market
policies, this will also decrease transitions into poverty and increase transition
r a t e sf r o mp o v e r t y( G a l l i ea n dP a u g a m ,2000: 5).
In this article, we make use of the welfare regime typology of Esping-
Andersen (1990), which makes a distinction between the corporatist, social
democratic and liberal regime types. The typology was, however, extended to
include a Southern regime type (see, for example, Ferrera, 1996). Our hypothesis
isthattheuseoffourregimetypeswillnotleadtoasigniﬁcantlossofinformation
compared to the use of separate country identiﬁers. Using this framework we
expect that social democratic regimes would lead to fewer poverty entries and
more exits than corporatist regimes, as, although levels of payment in the latter
may be relatively high, entitlements tend to be restricted to ‘core’ groups with
a history of employment. The higher levels of active labour market policy in
social democratic regimes should also have a negative impact on the probability
of experiencing poverty and the spell duration. However, corporatist and social
democratic regimes should both have more effective anti-poverty policies than
either liberal or Southern European type regimes, which tend to have means410 didier fouarge and richard layte
tested, low-level universal beneﬁt systems in the case of liberal and piecemeal
or non-existent beneﬁt systems in the case of Southern European regimes. This
pattern would be supported by the general absence of active labour market
policies in these types of regimes.
However, as has been pointed out in the research on income dynamics
(Fritzell, 1990), deriving hypotheses about income and poverty dynamics from
welfare regime theory is more difﬁcult than one may imagine. For example, the
more generous and higher level beneﬁts available in social democratic regimes
have been shown to lead to a lower risk of income poverty but, once in poverty,
lower levels of incentives and greater income stability may actually mean that
poverty spells are lengthened. In liberal and Southern regimes, less generous and
proactive welfare beneﬁt systems may be less effective at initially moving people
out of poverty, but higher levels of incentives may actually mean that exit rates
remain quite high. However, it is also possible, as Fritzell (1990) has pointed
out, that the greater income dispersion in liberal compared to social democratic
states may mean lower exit rates from poverty as income ranks are further apart.
Therefore, although we may be able to discern different exit patterns across
regimesusingtransitionrates,togetherthesedifferentprocessesmayleadtovery
similar net poverty durations across regimes.
Research questions
In the coming sections we seek to answer four speciﬁc questions about the
relationship between country institutions and regulations in the form of the
welfare regime and poverty dynamics. First, to what extent does the level of
recurrent and persistent poverty vary across countries? Second, to what extent
is this a function of the distribution of different socio-economic variables in
the country rather than the welfare regime?2 Third, are transition rates from
poverty and average durations of poverty in different countries related to the
welfare regime? And, fourth, to what extent is the probability of leaving poverty
inﬂuencedbyparticularsocio-economicpredictors–suchasemploymentstatus,
human capital and the household context – rather than welfare regime type? We
test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Using the theoretical framework outlined above, we should
ﬁnd that the social democratic countries will have lower rates of both recurrent
andpersistentpovertycomparedtocorporatist,withthelatterhavinglowerrates
than liberal and Southern European welfare regime countries.
Hypothesis2:Disadvantagedgroupsandparticularlythosewhoareunableto
participateinthelabourmarketwillhaveahigherriskofrecurrentandpersistent
poverty in all other regime types compared to the social democratic.
Hypothesis3:Thesocialdemocraticwelfareregimecountrieswillhavehigher
initialexitrates,butlowerlevelsofincentiveswillleadtosharplyfallingexitrateswelfare regimes and poverty dynamics 411
from poverty as duration increases. In liberal and Southern regimes, on the
other hand, low initial exit rates compared to corporatist and social democratic
countries will be maintained leading to roughly similar poverty durations across
different regimes.
The data
The results presented in this article are based on the User Data Base (UDB)
containing data from waves one to ﬁve (1994 to 1998) of the ECHP. We set our
poverty threshold at 60 per cent of median equivalised disposable income using
the ‘modiﬁed OECD’ equivalence scale where the ﬁrst adult in a household is
given the value 1, each additional adult is given a value of 0.5 and each child
av a l u eo f0.3. Equivalised income within each household is attributed to each
member,assumingacommonlivingstandardwithinthehousehold.Ouranalysis
is carried out using the individual as the unit of analysis.
Our dataset includes a total of 127,253 respondents in 1994 across eleven
countries, falling to 107,425 in 1998.3 At o t a lo f85,713 individuals are available for
analysisacrosstheﬁvewavesfrom1994to1998.Suchattritionhasbeenshownnot
to affect the reliability of the data (Watson, 2002), which remain representative
of the country populations for the years in question.4
Proﬁles of poverty in Europe
A number of different methodologies have been used to examine poverty
dynamics and each allows different questions to be examined (Atkinson et al.,
2002; Duncan and Rodgers, 1991;D u n c a net al., 1993; Layte and Whelan, 2003).
Pastresearchhastendedtoconcentrateonpovertypersistenceandthetechniques
used do not allow one to examine recurrent poverty in the form of repeated
spellsacrosstheobservationperiod.Giventhis,weapplythetypologyofpoverty
proﬁles developed in Muffels (1999) that allows us to examine both the per-
sistence and recurrence of poverty.
We distinguish among four types of poverty proﬁles:
 The persistent non-poor: never poor during the accounting period;
 The transient poor: poor only once during the accounting period;
 The recurrent poor: poor more than once, but never longer than two
consecutive years;
 The persistent poor: poor for a consecutive period of at least three consecutive
years.5
It may seem that the measure of poverty persistence used is rather arbitrary.
However, from empirical research (Bane and Ellwood, 1986;S t e v e n s ,1994, 1999),
itisknownthatthelikelihoodofescapingpovertydiminishesrapidlyafterhaving
been poor for two or more years. A good understanding of the distribution of
poverty over time can be obtained from such poverty proﬁles, which include412 didier fouarge and richard layte
information on the prevalence, periodicity and duration. However, as Ashworth
et al.( 1994) point out, poverty proﬁles have limitations. Because of left- and
right-handed censoring, the estimates of persistent poverty will be biased. This
is of concern, especially in short panels such as the one we are using. For this
reason, we will complement the analyses with more advanced techniques that
allow us to account for censoring.
Table 1 shows how poverty is distributed across the various proﬁles in the 11
countries for which data are available, using the 60 per cent of median income
poverty line. Looking at the results presented in the table, we must conclude that
a third of the EU population was found to experience poverty at least once in
the 1994–98 period. This is much more than the 17 to 18 per cent found when
using cross-sections (see European Commission, 2002: 186). Approximately a
third of those ever poor are only poor for a single year, while the others are
poor for a longer period of time. Almost 12 per cent of the EU population are
foundtobepersistentlypooraccordingtoourdeﬁnition.Thedifferencesbetween
countries are, however, substantial. The lowest poverty incidence is found in the
Netherlands, but even there 22 per cent of the population experienced poverty
in the second half of the 1990s. The highest poverty incidence is found in Greece
and Portugal. Both countries also display the highest rate of persistent poverty.
Although the country differences are large, it does seem that grouping by welfare
regime does make sense. In line with our ﬁrst hypothesis, we conclude that,
overall,thecountriesofthesocialdemocratictypedisplaylowerratesofpoverty.
TABLE 1.P o v e r t yp r o ﬁ l e si nE u r o p e ,60% of median income (percentages)∗.
Never poor Transient poor Recurrent poor Persistent poor Total
Social democratic 77.71 0 .66 .15 .61 0 0
Denmark 77.41 3 .26 .03 .51 0 0
The Netherlands 77.99 .66 .16 .41 0 0
Corporatist 70.71 1 .08 .01 0 .31 0 0
Germany 73.41 1 .17 .77 .81 0 0
Belgium 63.91 3 .41 0 .81 1 .91 0 0
France 68.41 0 .47 .91 3 .31 0 0
Liberal 61.61 3 .21 1 .01 4 .21 0 0
Ireland 63.81 0 .71 0 .61 4 .91 0 0
UK 61.41 3 .41 1 .11 4 .11 0 0
Residual 60.81 3 .11 3 .01 3 .11 0 0
Italy 62.11 2 .61 2 .31 3 .21 0 0
Greece 58.51 3 .91 2 .41 5 .21 0 0
Spain 60.01 3 .51 5 .11 1 .41 0 0
Portugal 58.81 3 .79 .51 8 .11 0 0
Europe 66.21 2 .01 0 .11 1 .71 0 0
Note: ∗ No attempt has been made here to account for left- and right-censoring when
constructing the poverty proﬁles.
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The next highest rates are found in the countries of the corporatist type. In
countriesbelongingtotheresidualandliberalwelfareregime,povertyisnotonly
higher but it is also more recurrent and persistent. In the next section, we will
see whether the differences found can be explained by differences in household
structure, human capital and labour market behaviour.
Determinants of poverty proﬁles
Previous research suggests that there is an ordering among the proﬁle
categories (Muffels et al., 1999;F o u a r g e ,2004) and, as such, in this article we
e s t i m a t eo r d e r e dp r o b i tm o d e l s( s e eG r e e n e ,2000: 876) to examine the events
that trigger membership of the different proﬁles of poverty. In the models, two
typesofvariablesareincludedwhicharelikelytobeimportantfactorspredicting
these different proﬁles:
 household formation events (divorce or separation) and
 labour market events (increase or decrease in the number of employed adults
in the household or in the number of hours worked).
In addition, a number of control variables were introduced in the models:
 personal and household characteristics (age, sex, marital status, household
composition, number of children, marital status);
 socio-economic characteristics (education level, labour market participation
at the household level, health situation).
Thevariablesaremeasuredjustbeforethebeginningofthepovertyspell.Changes
in the variables are measured at the time of entry into the poverty proﬁle.6 In
order to gain a better understanding of the labour market status and events
associated with poverty spells, the analyses were limited to individuals living in
a household where both the head and the partner – if any – were of working age
(aged 25 to 64).
Several models were estimated. Model 1 includes labour market and
household status variables just before the start of the poverty spell, as well as
variablesmeasuringchangeinhouseholdcharacteristicsandlabourmarketstatus
in the yearproceeding the poverty spelland theﬁrst yearof the spell.Becausefor
spellsstartingatwave1wecouldnotobservethevariables(‘left’-censoring),these
spells have been left out of the analysis. In addition to the variables of Model 1,
Model 2 also includes country dummies. This enables us to see whether or not,
aside from individual and household characteristics, country-speciﬁc features
inﬂuence poverty risk. Model 3 is the same as Model 2 except that the country
dummies are replaced with regime type dummies. Using this procedure, we can
test whether or not the country groupings suggested above make any sense from
an empirical point of view.414 didier fouarge and richard layte
Looking at Table 2, it is clear that, compared to couples without children
and singles, couples with children – but especially single parents – have a greater
probability of experiencing poverty. This, and the positive and signiﬁcant effect
forthenumberofchildren,addstothealreadyavailableevidenceregardingchild
poverty(seealsoVleminckxandSmeeding,2001;Bradburyetal.,2001).Changes
in the number of children – either more or fewer children – are both associated
with an increased and decreased poverty risk. At ﬁrst sight this ﬁnding seems
contradictory but can be explained through the effect that changes in household
compositionhaveonbothhouseholdincomeandhouseholdneeds(seeLayteand
Whelan,2003,foratreatmentofthisissue).Atentativeexplanationinthiscontext
is that young children coming into the household induce an additional ﬁnancial
burdenthatisgenerallylessthancompensatedbychildbeneﬁts.Childrenleaving
thehouseholdaregenerallyolderandhavetheirownmarketincome,whichmay
have negative consequences on the household’s income position. Separation, as
we can see from the model estimates, also has a positive effect on the poverty
risks.
Themodelcoefﬁcientswithrespecttotheeducationallevelofthehousehold
head demonstrate the private returns of investments in human capital in terms
of reduced poverty risk, an effect which holds even after correction for labour
market status. It is interesting to note that, as Fouarge (2004: 152–153) shows, the
effect of low educational attainment on poverty risk is stronger for persistent
than for transient poverty. A second indicator of human capital – health status –
shows a strong relationship with poverty risk. Other things being equal, living in
a household where the head reports bad health increases the probability of being
poor.
Turning to the second hypothesis we formulated, we must indeed conclude
thathouseholdswithaweaklabourmarketattachmentrunahigherriskofbeing
poor. This is particularly the case among couples where none of the partners
is employed or when only the female partner is employed, because in these
households the ‘needs’ are relatively high, while the ‘resources’ are low. Jobless
singles also run a proportionally higher risk of poverty. The poverty risk is not
only positively affected by unemployment history, but also by changes of labour
market status. A job loss by either the household head or their partner tends to
increase the poverty risk, while becoming employed has the opposite effect. This
illustrates the fact that additional income from the partner’s employment can
play an important role in the determination of the poverty risk.
The effects just described are rather similar across models. Once we control
for the observed characteristics of the individuals and the households, only Italy
turnsouttohaveahigherpovertyriskthantheUK(referencecountry).Although
most of the country dummies included in Model 2 turn out to be signiﬁcant,
theiraddedvalueintermsofexplainedvarianceislimited:theexplainedvariance
(pseudo-R2) increases from 0.147 to 0.152. Replacing the country dummies bywelfare regimes and poverty dynamics 415
TABLE 2. Results of ordered probit model for poverty proﬁles, 60% of median
income, persons in households where head and partner are aged 25–65.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Reference group: never poor β Sig β Sig β Sig
Female head (ref: male) −0.008 n.s. 0.016 n.s. −0.012 n.s.
Head aged 40–54 (ref: <40) 0.063 n.s. 0.060 n.s. 0.064 n.s.
Head aged 55–64 −0.190 ∗ −0.189 ∗∗ −0.184 ∗
Head separated/widowed (ref: married) −0.068 n.s. −0.021 n.s. −0.038 n.s.
Head unmarried 0.231 ∗ 0.273 ∗ 0.254 ∗
Couple with child (ref: couple, no child) 0.221 ∗∗ 0.195 ∗∗ 0.194 ∗∗
Single, no child 0.229 ∗∗ 0.270 ∗∗ 0.265 ∗∗
Single parent 0.857 ∗∗ 0.831 ∗∗ 0.840 ∗∗
Other household type −0.047 n.s. −0.075 n.s. −0.074 n.s.
Number of adults 0.134 ∗∗ 0.143 ∗∗ 0.134 ∗∗
Number of children 0.244 ∗∗ 0.252 ∗∗ 0.250 ∗∗
Head has average education (ref: high educ) 0.260 ∗∗ 0.304 ∗∗ 0.296 ∗∗
Head has low education 0.680 ∗∗ 0.658 ∗∗ 0.653 ∗∗
Person reports (very) bad health −0.076 n.s. −0.054 n.s. −0.074 n.s.
Household head reports (very) bad health 0.262 ∗ 0.277 ∗∗ 0.271 ∗∗
Only male employed (ref: both partners empl.) 0.548 ∗∗ 0.558 ∗∗ 0.541 ∗∗
Only female employed 0.626 ∗∗ 0.632 ∗∗ 0.627 ∗∗
None employed 1.076 ∗∗ 1.087 ∗∗ 1.073 ∗∗
Single male working 0.326 ∗∗ 0.284 ∗∗ 0.280 ∗∗
Single female working 0.396 ∗∗ 0.338 ∗ 0.358 ∗
Single male not working 1.376 ∗∗ 1.350 ∗∗ 1.337 ∗∗
Single female not working 1.258 ∗∗ 1.187 ∗∗ 1.200 ∗∗
Unemployment spell in past 5 years 0.424 ∗∗ 0.440 ∗∗ 0.423 ∗∗
Head lost job (ref: no change) 0.257 ∗∗ 0.257 ∗∗ 0.255 ∗∗
Head found job −0.354 ∗∗ −0.359 ∗∗ −0.361 ∗∗
Partner loses job (ref: no change) 0.263 ∗∗ 0.269 ∗∗ 0.265 ∗∗
Partner ﬁnds job −0.383 ∗∗ −0.402 ∗∗ −0.395 ∗∗
Less children (ref: no change) −0.667 ∗∗ −0.671 ∗∗ −0.662 ∗∗
More children −0.410 ∗∗ −0.430 ∗∗ −0.421 ∗∗
Separation 0.492 ∗∗ 0.501 ∗∗ 0.500 ∗∗
Ireland (ref: UK) −0.207 n.s.
Denmark −0.334 ∗∗








Social democratic (ref: Liberal) −0.257 ∗∗
Corporatist −0.194 ∗∗
Southern −0.038 n.s.
α1 2.389 2.269 2.262
α2 2.854 2.738 2.729
α3 3.628 3.520 3.506
N 75,888 75,888 75,888
Pseudo-R2 0.147 0.152 0.150
Note: ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%; n.s. non-signiﬁcant.
Source: ECHP UDB 1994–8.416 didier fouarge and richard layte
regime type dummies induces a small reduction of the explained variance from
0.152 to 0.150. Hence, we can conclude that replacing the country dummies by
regime dummies leads to deterioration of the explanatory power of the model.
It should, however, be noted that the effects for most of the regime dummies
are signiﬁcant and conform to our expectations (see hypothesis 1) with the
risk of poverty being lowest in the social democratic regime and highest in the
Southernandliberalregimes,withthecorporatistregimetakinganintermediate
position. When controlling for background characteristics, the Southern and
liberal models display similar levels of poverty incidence. Note, however, that
it is possible that the welfare regime variables also capture other effects than
merely welfare regime differences, such as differences in business cycle, GDP
level, speciﬁcinstitutions or industrial structure.Uunketal.(2003)usethe same
dataandwelfarestatetypologyasisusedheretostudytheeffectofwelfareregimes
on the impact of children on female labour supply. They show that the inclusion
of childcare supply and GDP in their models alters the welfare regime effects.
The inclusion of general economic indicators, as well as of indicators of speciﬁc
anti-poverty and low-income policies in our analyses, is the subject of ongoing
research. However, it can be argued that taking account of speciﬁc policies will
have less effect on our ﬁndings than in the type of analyses performed by Uunk
et al.( 2003). This is because the welfare regime typology used, which is based
on social security indicators, is more remote from the issue of children and
participation than from the analysis of poverty.
The duration of poverty
The analyses in the last section did not take account of the fact that many
of those found in poverty at the end of the observation period may well have
remained in poverty for a considerable period after this date (‘right’ censoring).
Such spells were treated in exactly the same manner as a single year of poverty in
the middle of the period. To control for such right censoring, we need to move
to a duration perspective which identiﬁes spells of poverty and examines their
characteristics.
Although there has been some research in the US using components-of-
variance models (Lillard and Willis, 1978), it was the now classic article by Bane
and Ellwood (1986) which ﬁrst applied exit probability analyses to poverty spells
data derived from panel surveys. This technique naturally controls for right
censoring by excluding censored cases from the denominator of the hazard rate
function, while making it possible to derive estimates of exit rates at a given spell
duration and mean duration for someone entering poverty. The methodology
has been extended in papers by Stevens (1994, 1999) and Jenkins and Rigg (2001).
In this section we apply hazard rate techniques to the ECHP using data
gathered at interviews in each wave of the panel survey to construct spells, or
durations, of poverty. These spells can be no more than approximations of thewelfare regimes and poverty dynamics 417
true experience of poverty, since the income and the needs of the household in
which the person lives may well have ﬂuctuated a great deal between the yearly
‘snapshots’ of the panel survey and thus they may not have actually been in
poverty for the whole period. Nonetheless, the method will provide interesting
insights into the factors that determine exit from poverty. Other caveats should
be borne in mind. Our estimates of average duration are restricted by the fact
that we have only ﬁve years of data, and left-censoring in 1994 means that spells
which begin in 1994 cannot be used. Unlike in Stevens (1999) but similar to Bane
and Ellwood (1986), only the ﬁrst poverty spell for each individual was used as
initial testsshowedthatthevastmajorityofsecondorhighernumberspellswere
censored and this led to differential bias in the analysis across countries.
Exit probabilities
One of the central concerns of both researchers and policy makers is the
speed at which people leave poverty and thus the resulting duration of poverty
spells. We can gain a descriptive picture of the probability of leaving poverty
at intervals in the poverty spell and an estimate of average duration using exit
probabilities.
Table 3 shows the overall exit probabilities for the ECHP sample of poverty
spells at each year of their duration. The ﬁgures show that the exit probability
falls quickly between the ﬁrst and second years of poverty from 48 per cent
to 34 per cent, but then the decrease slows to around 27 per cent by the third
year (remember there are no transitions after the third year to calculate exit
probabilities from). There are two interpretations that we could make of these
results. First, it may be that it is indeed harder to leave poverty the longer the
povertyspelllasts,perhapsbecauseone’sabilitytogetajobdecreasesasresources




TABLE 3.E x i tr a t e sf r o m60% median income poverty by spell duration 1995–8.
Spell length to date Exit probability Standard error Sample size 95%c o n ﬁ d .i n t e r v a l
10 .484 0.004 15,754 0.476–0.492
20 .339 0.007 4,621 0.325–0.353
30 .272 0.010 1,966 0.252–0.292
Source: ECHP UDB 1994–8.
Extrapolatingfromtheseresults,wecanseethataround75percentofpeople
justbeginningaspellofpovertywillhaveleftafterthreeyears.Interestingly,these
results are reasonably similar to those found by Bane and Ellwood (1986), who418 didier fouarge and richard layte
found that the exit probabilities in their US sample were 44.5 per cent in the
ﬁrst year, 28.5 per cent in the second and 24.6 per cent in the third, although the
Europeanratesarehigherandfallmoresubstantiallyoverthethreeyears.Luckily,
Bane and Ellwood (1986) had access to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID)with12yearsofusablepovertydataandsowereabletoestimatelong-run
transition rates. Using these data they found that exit probabilities carried on
decreasing after the third year, reaching just over 7 per cent by the eighth year.
Exit probabilities across regimes
It is likely that exit probabilities also differ between countries in the EU,
so in Table 4 we examine country-speciﬁc exit probabilities. Although there are
differencesintheexitratesinTable4,theoverallspreadofratesintheﬁrstyearis
actually quite small, with only 11 per cent separating the highest and lowest rates,
and eight of the countries being within 9 p e rc e n to fe a c ho t h e r .A f t e ro n ey e a r
of poverty, the Danish exit rate of 56 per cent is just 1 per cent higher than the
next highest rates in Spain and Belgium. At the other end of the scale, Portugal
and the UK have the lowest exit rates, 11 per cent behind that in Denmark.
However, as the duration of poverty lengthens, the difference in transition rates
between countries is somewhat reduced as faster falls in rates in some countries
balanceouthighexitratesintheinitialyear.Forexample,theDanishratefallsby
29 per cent between the ﬁrst and second years of poverty and by 63 per cent
between the ﬁrst and third. In Portugal and the UK, however, the rate in the
thirdyearissubstantiallyhigherthaninthesecond.Overall,thismeansthatafter
three years, over 72 per cent of those who entered a spell of poverty will have
left in all countries, with almost 79 per cent having left in Denmark compared to
72 per cent in France. Although the UK and Portugal have low rates of exit in the
ﬁrst year, by the third year over 77 per cent will have left poverty in Portugal and
76percentintheUK,thefourthandﬁfthhighesttotalsoutof11countries.These
results are interesting as they suggest that countries may not be that different in
their effectiveness at moving individuals out of poverty over a three-year period,
although some seem to have substantially more short spells than others.7
Whatimplicationsdotheseresultshaveforourhypotheses?Inmanyrespects
the results are congruent with our third hypothesis. Denmark, our prime social
democratic country, has the highest initial exit rate and the Netherlands, the
other representative of the social democratic regime, is not far behind. However,
the Netherlands groups more closely with the corporatist countries of Belgium
and Germany which have lower exit rates, but are close to the Danish ones. At
the other end of the spectrum, the Southern European and liberal countries of
Portugal, Greece, Ireland and the UK tend to have the lowest rates in the ﬁrst





































TABLE 4.E x i tr a t e sf r o m60% median income poverty by spell duration 1995–8 and country (standard error in parentheses).
Spell length Denmark Netherlands Germany Belgium France Italy Greece Spain Portugal UK Ireland
10 .557 0.524 0.512 0.548 0.474 0.543 0.471 0.547 0.448 0.448 0.466
(0.023)( 0.016)( 0.013) 0.020)( 0.013)( 0.011)( 0.012)( 0.011)( 0.013)( 0.014)( 0.016)
20 .395 0.240 0.346 0.254 0.375 0.414 0.325 0.338 0.341 0.283 0.298
(0.049)( 0.028)( 0.023)( 0.034)( 0.022)( 0.018)( 0.019)( 0.019)( 0.021)( 0.022)( 0.026)
30 .208 0.280 0.178 0.200 0.158 0.197 0.297 0.277 0.378 0.386 0.268
(0.070)( 0.043)( 0.029)( 0.044)( 0.027)( 0.024)( 0.028)( 0.030)( 0.030)( 0.0343 (0.036)
% Exited 78.87 4 .17 3 .87 3 .07 2 .27 8 .57 4 .97 8 .37 7 .47 5 .57 2 .6
After 3 Years420 didier fouarge and richard layte
Germany hold up the bottom of the table using the same measure. However, it
wouldbemoreaccuratetosaythatthereisactuallyverylittlevariationacrossthe
countries in exit rates over a three-year period, but this overall similarity stems
from different patterns of exit between countries in different regimes.
Duration models
The analyses of exit rates above do not take account of the different
distributions across countries of the individual and household characteristics
that can contribute to poverty levels and so may not give a good indication of
actual exit rates net of these factors. We control for these factors by estimating
a set of hazard rate models of exit from poverty conditional on a number of
independent predictors, the most important of which in the context of this
article is country. However, we will also be testing the hypothesis that it is the
typeofwelfareregimethatacountryexhibitsthatisimportant.Inestimatingthe
models we will be using all poverty spells which began after 1994 so we do not
estimate exit rates for left-censored cases, but we do not include multiple spells
for the same individuals.
Following Stevens (1999) and Jenkins and Rigg (2001) we specify a discrete-
time hazard rate model, which estimates the probability of making a transition
from poverty and its dependence on time. We thus measure the conditional
probability that the transition will occur, given that it has not occurred already
up to time t.8 In the duration models we use exactly the same independent
variables as used in the ordered probit model above. However, here we cannot
estimate variables that represent the type of change that occurs in household
circumstances, as this would lead to collinearity among right-censored cases.
Given our aim of comparing country hazard rates and doing so while
controlling for the distribution of individual and household characteristics in
the country, our modelling strategy is ﬁrst to ﬁt a basic model with variables for
time dependence, household and individual covariates. In the second model we
include country dummies and examine their signiﬁcance controlling for other
characteristics before ﬁtting a third model using variables representing welfare
regime types. Here we test whether regime variables are as effective at predicting
exit from poverty as the country variables. If so, we have evidence that welfare
regime theory is at least partially correct in its understanding of how country
welfare institutions and regulations impact on poverty dynamics.
Moving ﬁrst to Model 1,T able5shows,asdidthedescriptiveﬁndingsearlier,
thatthehazardofexitfrompovertydecreaseswithduration,thuseachadditional
period in poverty decreases the probability that the person will leave that state,
controlling for a host of individual and household characteristics as well as
country. This suggests that the decreasing transition rate found in Tables 3 and 4
was an accurate portrayal of duration dependence.
Looking at the other covariates, we can see that having a female head of
household slows down exit from poverty signiﬁcantly, as does having a head inwelfare regimes and poverty dynamics 421
TABLE 5. Results of Weibull discrete-time hazard rate models of exit from 60%
median income poverty controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, 25–65 years.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Reference group: never poor β Sig β Sig β Sig
Logged duration in poverty −0.94 ∗∗∗ −0.92 ∗∗∗ −0.96 ∗∗∗
Female head (ref: male head) −0.20 ∗ −0.19 ∗ −0.19 ∗
Head aged 40–54 (ref: −0.02 n.s −0.03 n.s −0.03 n.s
head aged<40)
Head aged 55–64 −0.14 ∗ −0.15 ∗ −0.14 ∗
Head separated/widowed −0.13 n.s −0.11 n.s −0.11 n.s
( r e f :h e a dm a r r i e d )
Head unmarried −0.27 ∗ −0.25 ∗ −0.25 ∗
Couple with child (ref: couple, 0.14 n.s 0.08 n.s 0.12 n.s
no child)
Single, no child 0.25 n.s 0.21 n.s 0.24 n.s
Single parent 0.14 n.s 0.12 n.s 0.13 n.s
Other 0.20 ∗ 0.17 ∗ 0.18 ∗
Number of adults 0.04 n.s 0.03 n.s 0.03 n.s
Number of children −0.07 ∗∗∗ −0.06 ∗∗∗ −0.06 ∗∗∗
Head has average education −0.17 ∗∗ −0.21 ∗∗ −0.18 ∗∗
(ref: high education)
Head has low education −0.13 ∗∗ −0.17 ∗∗∗ −0.17 ∗∗∗
Only male employed (ref: both −0.09 ∗ −0.09 ∗ −0.09 ∗
partners employed)
Only female employed −0.32 ∗∗∗ −0.33 ∗∗∗ −0.31 ∗∗∗
None employed −0.26 ∗∗∗ −0.29 ∗∗∗ −0.25 ∗∗∗
Single male working −0.10 n.s −0.11 n.s −0.10 n.s
Single female working 0.30 ∗ 0.28 n.s 0.28 ∗
Single male not working −0.18 n.s −0.22 ∗ −0.18 n.s
Single female not working 0.05 n.s −0.01 n.s 0.03 n.s
Unemployment in past 5 years −0.08 ∗ −0.10 ∗ −0.08 ∗










Social democratic (ref: Liberal) −0.03 n.s
Corporatist −0.13 ∗
Southern 0.02 n.s
Constant −0.12 n.s 0.01 n.s −0.05 n.s
Observations (Person Periods) 21050 21050 21050
Observations (Individuals) 14374 14374 14374
Log-Likelihood −13335.31 −13301.579 −13329.965
Standard Deviation of σv 0.410 0.412 0.625
ρ=σv/1+σv 0.670 0.681 0.422
Signiﬁcance of ρ ∗∗ ∗∗
Note: ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%; n.s. non-signiﬁcant.
Source: ECHP UDB 1994–8.422 didier fouarge and richard layte
the oldest age group (55–64). Less favourable employment conditions for these
groups or depreciated stock of human capital are possible explanations for this
ﬁnding. Interestingly, although being a single parent does not seem to impact on
exit, not being married does seem to be signiﬁcant and negative. Although the
number of adults in the household is not a signiﬁcant inﬂuence, each additional
childslowsexit.Theeffectforthenumberofchildrenisnotunexpected,asmuch
work shows that in many countries (although France is an exception) larger
numbers of children are associated with a greater poverty risk. As expected, the
educational qualiﬁcations of the household reference person has a signiﬁcant
impact, with those with average or low levels of qualiﬁcations leaving poverty
more slowly than those with higher levels of qualiﬁcations. Again, even after
controlling for the current employment status, the level of human capital does
seem to have an important pay-off in terms of poverty exit.
Moving on to the employment situation of household members, we see
that unemployment and non-participation are strongly associated with a slower
exit from poverty with the effect being particularly pronounced in households
with married or cohabiting partners, neither of whom work, or with single non-
working individuals. This ﬁnding is in line with hypothesis 2. Lastly, there is a
signiﬁcant negative effect associated with a household head having a history of
unemployment.Thisisnotunexpectedaspastunemploymentwouldcontribute
tobothhigherlevelsofdebtinthepresentandlowerearningcapacity,decreasing
the probability that the person would exit from poverty.
In Models 2 and 3 we turn to the examination of whether the differences
between countries can be represented as differences between welfare regimes,
as we suggest in hypothesis 3. We hypothesised that the overall hazard of exit
between countries controlling for duration would be rather similar because of
the different processes involved, and this seems largely true except for negative
effectsforBelgiumandGreeceandapositivecoefﬁcientforItalyinModel2.None
of these effects would have been predicted before, even taking into account the
results of the descriptive analyses in Table 4. The negative coefﬁcient for Belgium
in Model 2 is translated into a negative coefﬁcient for the corporatist regime in
Model 3. Overall, there is no signiﬁcant difference between the exit rates of the
SouthernEuropeanregimecountries,thesocialdemocraticcountriesandliberal
regime countries. Despite the differences in poverty persistence among welfare
state regimes (see discussion of Table 2), these results reinforce the ﬁndings from
the descriptive analyses in Table 4 that different patterns of exit from poverty
lead, over the medium term, to roughly similar rates of exit from poverty for
countries with different welfare regimes.
Conclusion
In this article, we used the ﬁrst ﬁve waves of the ECHP – covering the years
1994 to 1998 – to examine the structure of spells, their average duration and thewelfare regimes and poverty dynamics 423
determinants of duration. We have sought to evaluate how well the different
welfarestatesofEuropeperformintermsofpreventingincomepovertyandhow
household and individual characteristics inﬂuence poverty duration.
We have shown that even in the richest countries of Europe poverty is still a
widespread phenomenon: a third of the EU population were poor at least once
in the 1994–98 period. Most of these people escaped poverty, though some more
quicklythan others,butalmost 12percentdidexperiencepersistent poverty. Itis
clear that singles, and especially single parents, are more likely to be persistently
poor and have a lower probability of exiting poverty. Other things being equal,
additionalchildrenoradults–byaddingtotheneedsofthehousehold–increase
the poverty risk. Joblessness is also associated with an increased risk of long-
term poverty and a decreased likelihood of poverty exit, suggesting that the
reintegration of the unemployed is still relatively poor in European countries.
Education was found to have a signiﬁcant impact on the poverty risk, even when
we control for employment status. This demonstrates the importance of private
returns to investment in human capital in terms of reduced poverty risk.
We have argued that the institutional context within which poverty occurs
mattersandhavefoundevidencesupportingthisview.Theuseofwelfareregime
dummies only leads to a minor loss of explanatory power compared to using
country variables. This suggests that EU welfare states do cluster around more
broadly deﬁned welfare regimes and these welfare regimes strongly inﬂuence the
extent of long-run poverty. In particular, countries in the social democratic
tradition do a better job of preventing both short- and long-term poverty.
Countries in the liberal tradition and Southern European countries display
much higher rates of poverty and longer durations of poverty spells, while
countries in the corporatist tradition take an intermediate position. Despite
their dissimilar patterns of poverty duration, European welfare states display




remain more constant over time. This could suggest lower levels of incentives in
the former. It will be interesting to see if the patterns that we have observed here
are replicated when the full eight years of the ﬁnal ECHP are used.
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Notes
1 See Duncan et al.( 1993), Headey et al.( 1997), Goodin et al.( 1999), Leisering and Leibfried
(1999),Jenkins(2000)and,morerecently,LayteandWhelan(2003)andJenkinsandSchluter
(2003).
2 It should be borne in mind that the distribution of different socio-economic statuses is
not unrelated to the welfare state structure. To take a basic example, the very different
distributions of unemployment across the population among countries are to a substantial
extent the result of different employment protection regimes in these countries.
3 This article is restricted to those countries that contributed respondents to the data ﬁle in
each year between 1994 and 1998. We thus drop Luxembourg, Austria, Finland and Sweden
from the analyses.
4 For the poverty proﬁles, we use a balanced panel of ‘survivors’ who remained in the sample
from 1994 to 1998,a n du s et h e1998 ‘base weight’ for this group as speciﬁed by Eurostat.
Unfortunately, this weighting regime is not possible in the duration analyses. We deal with
attrition here by using independent variables in the models to adjust for the factors that are
used in the Eurostat weights to control for the distribution of these factors within countries
(see Eurostat, 2003).
5 The deﬁnition is based on the length of the longest poverty spell in the period. Note that the
poverty proﬁle depends on the time window in which measurement is made. Extending the
observation period changes the distribution of the poverty proﬁles.
6 We use information from the last wave and changes between the ﬁrst and the last wave in
the case of the reference category ‘never poor’.
7 The higher proportion of short spells in some countries could also suggest that the income
data upon which these analyses are based could also vary in quality across countries.
8 To take account of unobserved heterogeneity, an individual speciﬁc error term εi with zero
mean and normal (Gaussian) distribution is added to the models. The two bottom rows of
Table 5 show that unobserved heterogeneity is indeed a signiﬁcant factor in all models.
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